Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
衡水市人民政府关于印发《衡水市古树名木管理办法》的通知
河北省衡水市人民政府
衡水市人民政府关于印发《衡水市古树名木管理办法》的通知
各县市区人民政府，开发区、滨湖新区管委会，市直有关部门：
《衡水市古树名木管理办法》已经市政府研究同意，现印发给你们，请结合实际，认真贯彻实施。
二0一一年九月十九日
衡水市古树名木管理办法
第一条 为了加强对古树名木的保护管理，根据《中华人民共和国森林法》、国务院《城市绿化条例》和《河北省城市绿化管理条例》等法律、法规的规定，结合本市实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法适用于本市行政区域内的所有古树名木及其设施的保护管理。
第三条 本办法所称古树名木，是指具备下列条件之一，并经市园林绿化和市林业主管部门按职责分工范围分别鉴定列为保护的树木：
（一）古树指树龄在100年以上，外貌古老苍劲的大树；
（二）名木指树种珍贵，国内外稀有的树木；
（三）具有历史价值或重要纪念意义的树木。
第四条 古树名木的保护管理工作实行统一领导，分级管理。市园林绿化、林业主管部门负责古树名木的保护管理，并监督、检查本办法的实施。地处城市、建制镇的古树名木，由区县园林绿化主管部门负责管理；地处农村的古树名木，由区县林业主管部门负责管理。
第五条 任何单位和个人都有保护管理古树名木的责任。古树名木生存地所在单位，即为该古树名木的具体管护单位。管护单位应在当地街道办事处或乡（镇）人民政府直接领导下进行管护工作。
公园、寺庙、机关、部队、学校、团体和企事业单位内生存的古树名木，由所在单位管护。
住宅小区、居民院落或其他公共地带内生存的古树名木，由街道办事处或乡（镇）人民政府指定村民委员会或指定专人管护。
第六条 古树名木的管护及设施所需的费用，按照国家有关规定划出一定比例的经费予以解决。
第七条 对符合第三条规定受保护的古树名木，市园林绿化、林业主管部门应对其进行统一登记，建立档案，落实管护单位，并设立保护标牌，标明树名、树龄、等级、编号、管护单位，并应制定出具体的养护管理办法和技术措施。对有特殊历史价值和重要纪念意义的古树名木应建立说明牌。
第八条 古树名木管护单位要切实做好保护工作，禁止下列损害其生长的行为：
（一）损伤树皮，攀折树枝，在树身上敲打、钉钉、刻划、架电线、缠绕铁丝、拴绳挂物；
（二）在树冠覆盖范围内圈围、挖土、堆物、堆肥、堆料、堆垃圾或焚烧物品；
（三）借树搭棚或兴建临时建筑；
（四）在树根附近倾倒有害污水、废渣；
（五）在距树木基部边缘半径2米以内封砌地面；
（六）未经园林绿化、林业主管部门或街道办事处、乡（镇）人民政府同意，随意采集树枝和果实。
第九条 园林绿化、林业主管部门应当定期对古树名木的生长和管护情况进行检查，发现长势濒危的，应当提出抢救措施，并监督实施。
第十条 古树名木的管护单位，应在园林绿化、林业主管部门指导下，按照技术规范，做好松土、浇水、施肥和防治病虫害等养护工作。古树名木受害或者长势衰弱，管护单位应及时报告园林绿化、林业主管部门，并按要求进行治理、复壮；如遇大风、洪水、雷电等异常危害时，要采取紧急保护措施，同时向园林绿化或林业主管部门报告。各有关部门要密切合作，采取措施，做好保护工作。
第十一条 对死亡的古树名木，由区（县）园林绿化、林业主管部门查明原因，上报市园林绿化、林业主管部门核查无误后，予以注销。需采伐的应按规定申请办理许可证，凭证采伐，木材归树权单位所有。
第十二条 城乡建设规划和建设工程，涉及古树名木时，建设单位在执行规划设计、征用土地过程中，应当严格保护，避让或设立古树名木保护措施。建筑物（包括地下管线）同树冠边缘的距离由规划行政主管部门与园林绿化主管部门共同研究，确定避让保护措施。四周均为建筑群体的，应当有一方的建筑高度不超过7米，以保证树木有合理的生长环境和条件。规划行政主管部门在审批时应先征求园林绿化主管部门意见，再划红线。
第十三条 建设单位应对施工范围内的古树名木采取措施加强保护。市园林绿化、林业主管部门应在竣工验收时进行检查，如发现古树名木有被损伤或造成死亡的，应追究建设单位的责任。
第十四条 严禁砍伐、随意移植古树名木。如遇国家重点建设工程确实无法避让，确需移植的，应当经市规划行政主管部门会同市园林绿化主管部门研究，报市人民政府批准。移植应当精心操作，保证质量。移植费和移植后的保护措施以及有关养护费，由建设单位负责。
第十五条 对影响古树名木生长的生产设施或兴建的违章建筑，其生产单位或建筑单位、个人，应当按照本办法的规定在园林绿化、林业主管部门提出的限期内主动拆除。逾期不拆除的，园林绿化、林业主管部门会同清理违章建筑的行政主管部门按有关规定强制拆除。
第十六条 对有重要纪念意义或特殊价值的古树名木，应保留其原貌，对枯枝应采取防腐措施加以保护，不得随意修剪。
第十七条 对管护古树名木成绩显著的单位和个人，由园林绿化、林业主管部门给予表彰或奖励。
第十八条 对违反本办法的行为，视其情节按下列规定给予处罚：
（一）违反本办法第八条所列行为之一的，古树名木尚未遭受损伤的，应予以批评教育，并责令其停止损害行为；已造成损伤的，应当承担赔偿责任，并对直接责任者处以1000元以下罚款。
（二）违反本办法第十条，不按技术规范养护古树名木，致使其生长受到影响的，除责令其改正外，对管护单位处以100元—300元罚款。
（三）违反本办法第十一条，擅自处理自然死亡的古树名木的，对管护单位处以300元—500元罚款，并没收其木材。
（四）对因管护不善造成古树名木死亡的，由直接责任单位或个人按古树名木价值（一般按树木材积量赔偿费的3-5倍计算）赔偿损失，并按损失费的1-2倍处以罚款。
（五）违反本办法规定，损伤、擅自迁移、砍伐或因管理不当等原因导致古树名木死亡的，由园林绿化、林业主管部门对责任单位或个人处以1000元—10000元罚款。
第十九条 园林绿化、林业主管部门及其管理人员应忠于职守，依法办事。对玩忽职守、徇私舞弊的管理人员，由其所在单位或上级主管部门给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，移交司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第二十条 本办法自公布之日起施行。
